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WALTER G. SECADA
Editor

University of Wisconsin-Madison

CONTRIBUTORS

ARNETHA F. BALL
DANIELLE A. CROSBY
JACQUELYNNE S. ECCLES
R. MATTHEW GLADDEN
OKHEE LEE
MICHELE S. MOSES
MARIKA N. RIPKE
JANICE TEMPLETON



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Not only are schools asked to focus on educating an increasingly diverse population of young people, they provide sites where other social interventions are implemented. In *Extracurricular and Other After-School Activities for Youth*, Jacquelynne S. Eccles and Janice Templeton explore the impacts of such interventions on supporting the prosocial development of youth. Their chapter supports the observation that, insofar as healthy youth development is predicated on experiences that support outcomes similar to the goals of schooling, there should be cooperation between high-quality programs and schools. Their comments on how mixed research methods can help develop more compelling understandings of complex phenomena should help move educational researchers beyond the "either/or" stance of the old quantitative–qualitative or positivist–critical–postpositivist debates.

Okhee Lee, in *Promoting Scientific Inquiry With Elementary Students From Diverse Cultures and Languages*, and Arnetta F. Ball, in *Three Decades of Research on Classroom Life: Illuminating the Classroom Communicative Lives of America's At-Risk Students*, help us to revisit issues on the processes of schooling. To Lee, the question of whether minority-language students—even those whose mastery of English is challenging to their schools and teachers—can participate in classes that promote scientific reasoning has been answered affirmatively. More importantly, however, her review gives insights as to the characteristics of the practices that promote such participation. Ball's review of students' lives in their classrooms, with the lens set at two levels of analysis, reminds us of the complexity of students' lives.

Michele S. Moses, in *The Heart of the Matter: Philosophy and Educational Research*, provides a reminder as to the very important contributions that philosophers make through their insistence on clarity when researchers frame a problem in one or another. Moreover, her compelling distinction between philosophy of education and philosophy in education echoes Ball's two levels of analysis involving classroom processes.

Many themes echo across these chapters. For example, Ball, by looking at macro- and micro-level classroom processes; Gladden, by considering individual programs and schools as organizations; and Moses, by drawing a distinction between philosophy in and of education, make important distinctions without falling into the trap of "either/or."

Yet as a group, they remind me—very forcefully—that education extends beyond what happens within schools. I end my tenure as editor wondering if educational researchers, through our focus on framing problems in ways that we understand among ourselves, are not mirroring how schools try to use their walls to keep out the violence, uncomfortable social forces that impact on students' lives, and programs (that if properly implemented might be beneficial to students). Education intersects with larger social phenomena in many different ways. We need to better understand these intersections not just as educational phenomena but also as legal, social, psychological, and political acts. To engage in these large and complex problems, the next generation of educational research may need to mount work that crosses disciplinary boundaries and draws on the talents on research scholars representing those disciplines in the ways that echo the reviews by Gladden, Ripke and Crosby, and Eccles and Templeton. But it should not forget the nuance found in the more focused reviews of Lee, Ball, and Moses.

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Chapter 1

The Heart of the Matter: Philosophy and Educational Research

MICHELE S. MOSES
Arizona State University

Philosophy has long played a significant role in educational scholarship, from the thought of Plato to Jean-Jacques Rousseau to John Dewey to Nel Noddings. In this chapter, I demonstrate how philosophy continues to be a vital part of careful education scholarship. Because the primary audience is the broader educational research community, I as far as possible avoid the intricacies of philosophers' internecine contentions in order to concentrate on characterizing the general positions taken, though I do take up this issue toward the end.

I divide the discussion into examples of philosophy *in* educational research and philosophy *as* educational research. Philosophy *in* educational research refers to the kind of philosophical analysis that takes the practice of empirical educational research as its point of departure. It involves critical discussions of research methodology and how empirical educational research is framed.

Philosophy *as* educational research is relatively more autonomous and more long standing, and it construes "educational research" more broadly. Philosophy *as* educational research refers to the kind of analysis that has been, traditionally, associated with the philosophy *of* education, which is, in its own turn, a subarea of philosophy that draws on the parent discipline to determine how to frame and analyze philosophical problems peculiar to education.

The distinction is a matter of emphasis; the two categories obviously overlap significantly. One point that I wish to emphasize with my use of philosophy *as* educational research is that philosophical analysis is a genre of educational research in its own right. Because empirical work is dominant and central to educational research, especially within graduate schools of education, philosophical research is often not considered to be real research or, to qualify, is forced into a framework that it does not fit. Because philosophical work is not the same as empirical work, it is often taken to be *divorced* from it (e.g., National Research Council, 2002). But this is a misconception. Philosophers routinely use the findings of empirical research in developing and testing the adequacy of their theories; at the same time, empirical work makes commitments to positions on issues that are, at their core, philosophical. In this vein, I highlight a major contribution that philosophy has made to scholarship on the problem of inequality as an exemplar of the role that philosophical analysis plays within educational research.

PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

Questions of scientific research and methodology have long been a central part of the discipline of philosophy. Epistemology and the philosophy of science are the philosophical subfields that lay claim to the specific examination of these questions. Philosophers of education have long engaged in methodological inquiries as well. Harry Broudy, Bob Ennis, and Leonard Krimerman's (1973) edited volume focused on questions such as the following: How scientific should educational research be? And, more specifically, "Will the methods that have worked so brilliantly in the physical sciences be equally fruitful in the social and behavioral domains?" (p. vi).

These methodological discussions are key for fostering an understanding of the landscape of social and educational research, from positivistic to critical research (e.g., House & Howe, 1999; Howe, 1985, in press; Phillips, 1987; Phillips & Burbules, 2000; Schrag, 1989). Philosophical investigation comes into play when a particular methodological issue is best analyzed through the lenses of, say, epistemology or philosophy of science. Indeed, regardless of who engages in it, much of the conversation about educational research methodology is carried out in terms of concepts whose original home is philosophy. "Positivism," "epistemology," "paradigm," and "postmodernism" are just a few examples.

The exemplars of philosophical analysis that follow fall into two loose categories: analyses of deep methodological issues and critiques of current empirical work and educational reform and policy ideas. Although different in focus, these two kinds of philosophical analysis share an interest in illuminating the terrain of educational research, from clarifying methodological discussions to evaluating research findings and policy prescriptions.

Overarching Discussions of Research Methodology

In a series of articles published in the *Educational Researcher*, philosophers of education joined the contentious debate about educational research methodology prompted by the advent of qualitative methods (Garrison, 1986; Howe, 1985, 1988, 1998; Howe & Eisenhart, 1990; Phillips, 1983). Drawing on developments in the philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century, they show how and why positivism is philosophically moribund, and they characterize several viable successors, such as postpositivism and pragmatism. One of their central themes is that the educational research community should not set up positivism as one epistemology to which others ought to negatively define themselves, since positivism is not a philosophically viable alternative.

An important corollary point is that quantitative and qualitative research methods ought not (and cannot) be distinguished and set in opposition to one another on the grounds that quantitative methods are inherently and exclusively positivistic and suited only for *confirmation*, whereas qualitative methods are inherently and exclusively interpretative and suited only for *understanding*. These philosophers of education have not tried to end controversies about educational research methodology—

inherently philosophical controversies—but to spur the educational research community to engage in them in a more philosophically defensible way.

Several philosophers of education have recently developed book-length examinations of educational research methodology that grow out of the ongoing controversies. One example is D. C. Phillips and Nicholas Burbules's *Postpositivism and Educational Research* (2000). They offer a historically grounded account of positivism, postpositivism, and the issues these paradigmatic approaches raise for social and educational researchers. Phillips and Burbules tackle many controversial issues within epistemology and philosophy of science. They defend postpositivism as the best available approach for sound social and educational research. In so doing, they endeavor to cull what is good and useful from positivism and to debunk myths about postpositivism surrounding the experimental method, value neutrality, and quantitative analysis. Even though they concede that many logical positivist tenets are mistaken, Phillips and Burbules maintain that the positivist emphases "on clarity and the grounding of our beliefs on observations still stand as ideals we ought not to dismiss too lightly" (p. 11).

In addition, they attempt to explain why foundationalism is rightly no longer a dominant epistemology. Among the reasons they cite are that one person's rational faculties need not match another's; perceptions are theory laden; evidence underdetermines theory; evidence is problematic as it relates to people's network of beliefs; induction is uncertain; and research is often a social/communal activity, which means that researchers influence each other. Accordingly, they characterize postpositivism as "a *nonfoundationalist* approach to human knowledge that rejects the view that knowledge is erected on absolutely secure foundations—for there are no such things; postpositivists accept *fallibilism* as an unavoidable fact of life" (p. 29).

Finally, Phillips and Burbules argue that educational inquiry should be scientific, and that the best inquiry is. They argue for a vision of research that transcends beliefs and feelings. As a result, they argue that researchers "need to aspire to something a little stronger, seeking beliefs that (1) have been generated through rigorous inquiry and (2) are likely to be true; in short, they need to seek *knowledge*" (p. 3). These tenets form what they, following Karl Popper, call a regulative ideal that should guide inquiry. Through philosophical inquiry, Phillips and Burbules help educators, educational researchers, and others navigate the terrain of disciplined inquiry in education from a postpositivistic perspective.

Kenneth Howe's *Closing Methodological Divides: Toward Democratic Educational Research* (in press) provides a second example of an extended philosophical examination of methodological issues in educational research. Locating the issues within the purview of philosophy, Howe states:

Qualitative versus quantitative methods, facts versus values, science versus politics, subjectivity versus objectivity, postmodernism versus pragmatism, to name a few—are at the core of a lively, sometimes divisive, conversation that has been unfolding in the theory of educational research for some time. These issues fall squarely within the province of philosophy, and thus philosophical investigation has an especially useful contribution to make.

Howe is careful, however, to point out that while these issues are of great philosophical interest, scholars based in other disciplines have contributed to the conversation as well. An educational foundation in philosophy of science and in epistemology provides philosophers of education with a particular vantage point, one that is unique among scholars of education, with which to examine these methodological controversies.

Howe examines the landscape of educational inquiry from a pragmatic perspective and focuses on resolving some of the most controversial issues. He aims to render untenable what he calls the "two dogmas of educational research"—the fact-value bifurcation and the quantitative-qualitative split. Howe argues that these dogmas have been responsible for counterproductive debates about the assumptions and methodology of educational research and for unnecessarily dividing the educational research community into factions.

Howe concludes that educational research is inherently laden with values and politics but need not lack the capacity to support methodologically sound, unbiased conclusions for that reason. He maintains that educational research ought to be rooted in and guided by the values associated with a genuine form of democratic politics.

Critique of Research and Policy

Another way that philosophy is present *in* educational research is through its contribution to critiquing and framing empirical educational research. By participating in educational research in this way, philosophers engage the empirical research world and help make needed theoretical connections to education policy and practice.

In the teaching and learning arena, philosophers of education have provided a major voice in the conversation about the problems and prospects of "constructivism." Kenneth Strike (1992) and Nel Noddings (Davis, Maher, & Noddings, 1990) joined the discussion early on, which has come to include the contributions of James Garrison (1995), D. C. Phillips (1995, 2000), and Michael Matthews (1997, 2000). Additional philosophers of education joined in philosophical analyses of constructivism in the 2000 yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) (e.g., Eric Bredo, Nicholas Burbules, Kenneth Howe, Jason Berv, and Luise McCarty). Among the issues analyzed were how constructivism itself may be characterized, the difference between and problems with social constructivism and psychological constructivism, what bodies of knowledge are socially constructed and how strongly, how constructivism affects science and math education, and the impact of constructivist ideas on educational research.

In the political policy arena, school choice has provided fertile ground for philosophy *in* educational research. Amy Gutmann (1987) and Mary Ann Raywid (1983, 1987) entered the conversation early on, when little if any empirical research was available. Gutmann questioned the use of market ideas to reform public schools that were supposed to educate students for democratic participation. Raywid put forth a more moderate approach to school choice while still arguing against voucher schemes.

Howe (1997) used the scant empirical evidence available even in the 1990s to point to developing difficulties in whether the theory behind choice was playing out in the way choice advocates predicted, including the theory of democracy outlined in John Chubb and Terry Moe's *Politics, Markets and America's Schools* (1990).

More recently, Stacy Smith (1999) has provided a philosophically astute investigation of charter schools in light of current developments in the political theory of democracy. Smith argues that charter schools ought to be in concurrence with the ideals of deliberative democratic theory if they are to be able to balance their private aims with public educational interests. While she affirms the hopeful possibilities for choice and autonomy offered by charter schools, she cautions that "charter schools are in need of normative standards that can be employed to balance their particularistic aims against public interests in things like fair representation, democratic governance, and civic education" (p. 131). Her analysis provides researchers of charter schools with a redefinition of the charter school questions, which has significant implications for further empirical study. In a similar vein, Harry Brighouse (2000) provides an extended philosophical analysis of school choice that takes into account empirical research findings to help determine what is *feasible*, constraining the policy recommendations he proffers at the end.

Next on the horizon for philosophy *in* educational research is likely to be the standards movement and its marriage to high-stakes testing and accountability. Several philosophers of education have already joined this conversation (e.g., Howe, 1994, 1995; Noddings, 1992; Raywid, 2002).¹

PHILOSOPHY AS EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

Like philosophy *in* educational research, philosophy *as* educational research also deals with controversial educational issues. It is characterized in part by the more traditional types of philosophy of education, including analyses of the deeper purposes of education. In addition, it is characterized by the development of clear conceptual frameworks that aid in the examination of educational policy and practice. In the sections that follow, I provide several illustrations of how philosophy functions as educational research. Philosophical contributions to the study of the problem of inequality in education, which are concerned with both educational aims and conceptual frameworks for education policy, will serve as a final, extended example.

Educational Aims

Philosophical scholarship that clarifies the broad aims and meanings of education in general (e.g., Callan, 1988; Dewey, 1916, 1938; Fullinwider, 1996; Gutmann, 1987; Locke, 1892; Martin, 1992; Plato, 1990; Reich, 2002) is most often what people think of when they think about philosophy of education. This more traditional philosophical work addresses questions such as the following: What is knowledge? What is education? and What ought education to be in a liberal democratic society?

Dewey's work provides the most well-known example of philosophy of education concerned with the aims and meanings of education itself. In one of his later books, *Experience and Education* (1938), Dewey responded to those who did not really understand his theories of education or who took his ideas to the extreme, such as those who set up schools where children were allowed to do as they pleased. He pointed out that many so-called progressives built their new education as a negative reaction to the traditional basic education with which they did not agree. Dewey, on the other hand, built his new vision of education on a theory of experience, with growth as the primary aim of education. He defined growth as the constant enriching and expanding of our knowledge, akin to the critical thinking and problem solving focused on today. Thus, Dewey tried to make explicit his own brand of progressivism and to correct the excesses of many of his followers. As such, he argued against the either/or mentality wherein education was seen either as traditional (content based) or as progressive (skills based). His arguments are well worth dusting off in the current policy climate.

Gutmann's (1987) theory of democratic education is another example of philosophical scholarship on the purposes of education. A philosopher and political theorist, Gutmann puts forth a normative democratic theory of what the main educational aims ought to be in a liberal democratic society such as that of the United States. Within Gutmann's notion of a "democratic state of education," the authority and governance of public education are shared among educators, parents, and the public, and the core aim of education is to consciously reproduce the democratic way of life. In arguing for her conception of democratic education, Gutmann defends two main purposes of primary education that she claims are essential in a healthy, functioning democracy. First is fostering deliberation so that students learn to behave and think critically and, thus, learn both respect for authority and skepticism of it. The second purpose is the development of democratic character, so that students are educated in character and moral reasoning. The idea is that these aims, when met, will foster students' ability to participate fully in a democracy as citizens.

Similarly, in more recent work in political philosophy, Rob Reich (2002) aims to demonstrate the paramount importance of the principle of autonomy as an educational aim in a liberal democracy. He examines autonomy within the philosophical literature in order, first, to make sense of the concept and put forth his own conception, which he terms minimal autonomy, and, second, to outline what minimal autonomy means for education. Reich advocates for an education that emphasizes students' development of critical and reflective abilities so as to foster their capacity for autonomy. His vision is that such an education will allow schools to both foster democratic citizenship and honor multiculturalism.

Albeit in different ways, Dewey (1916, 1938), Gutmann (1987), and Reich (2002) all serve as exemplars of how philosophy *as* educational research provides educators and researchers alike with a foundational understanding of the fundamental aims and meanings of education. Such theoretical work both adds to and informs issues within the larger study of education, such as teaching, learning, and policy.

Conceptualizing Frameworks for Education Policy and Practice

Another way that philosophy functions *as* educational research is by conceptualizing alternative frameworks for the analysis of educational policy and practice. And to reinforce my earlier remark, this is where philosophy *as* educational research routinely *uses* empirical research.

In *Embracing Race: Why We Need Race-Conscious Education Policy* (Moses, 2002), I address the question of what the educational system must do to promote social justice for students of color and poor students. I examine what is required to help these students develop self-determination and argue that race-conscious education policies are defensible because they play a central role in the development of self-determination of students who otherwise are left with a deficient education. To support my contention, I analyze four race-conscious education policies: bilingual education, multicultural curricula, affirmative action, and remedial education. In doing so, I briefly trace the histories of each policy, identify underlying principles and assumptions, and examine relevant empirical research. I then measure these against a contemporary liberal framework.

Consider affirmative action policy. Analyzed simply, affirmative action may be either supported or opposed as a matter of fairness: It is fair to remedy past discrimination with affirmative action programs, or, alternatively, it is unfair to prefer some persons at the expense of others. However, examined philosophically, those on both sides of the debate can come to understand that affirmative action is not simply fair or unfair but is a necessary education policy that promotes the self-determination of students of color whose self-determination has historically not been considered important (Moses, 2001). As this example illustrates, the philosophical and practical issues within policy debates are actually inseparable. The general argument in *Embracing Race* hinges on the premise that self-determination is required for justice. In a time of political backlash against most race-conscious education policies, it is critical for philosophers to contribute to reasonable and well-considered policy decisions by providing educators and policymakers with a principled and nuanced foundation—a foundation that is clearly and thoughtfully articulated, not taken for granted.

Noddings's (1992) work is a fine example of scholarship that is excellent philosophy and extremely valuable as educational research on curricular and school reform. In *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education*, Noddings brings the ethical framework from her previous work on caring to bear on the nature of public schooling in the United States. In so doing, she criticizes several prominent characteristics of contemporary public schooling: the emphasis on competition and testing, the disciplinary knowledge that defines a liberal education, the idea of the same education for all in the name of equal opportunity, and the evaluation of school activities mainly in terms of how well they contribute to learning the given curricula. These characteristics are indicative of what Noddings calls a male-oriented ethic of principles, which she advocates moving to the background in favor of the ethics of care. By taking the ethics of care seriously, the educational system could come to

be defined in terms of relationship rather than principles. In order to take the ethics of care seriously, Noddings calls for a fundamental revision of the curriculum, instruction, and structure of public schooling in the United States.

This last type of contribution made by philosophers to educational research may be viewed as at the heart of philosophy of education, especially when taking into account what the larger educational research community finds valuable in philosophy of education. Philosophy, then, may be placed at the heart of educational research, both by providing conceptual and theoretical grounding for important empirical work and, perhaps even more important, by providing alternative theoretical perspectives that can be normatively applied to the most significant educational issues and debates of the day.

Inequality

The problem of inequality—in schools, of education—is arguably the most vexing issue facing educational researchers of every stripe. Philosophy's single largest contribution, in my estimation, has been its analysis of inequality. It has been a frequent subtheme throughout but deserves more explicit examination. I thus provide a relatively extended discussion of it as a final example.

The unequal treatment of persons is a social problem that has disturbingly permeated the educational system in the United States from its inception. It has thus been the source of much philosophical study, from questions about what equality is to whether it ought to be the highest priority of a liberal democratic society and how to conceptualize equal educational opportunity. Philosophers in general and philosophers of education in particular have worked to shed light on this thorny problem. Of course, philosophy is not the only foundational discipline concerned with the problem of inequality in education—not by a long shot. However, philosophy of education has the singular ability to cross between the discipline of philosophy and its writings to education and important educational debates. In studying equality of education, for example, insightful theories of equality put forth by philosophers (e.g., Dworkin, 2000; Sen, 1992) may be brought to bear on educational questions surrounding equality of educational opportunity and other issues of social justice in a democratic society.

The philosophical literature is home to many analyses concerning the problem of inequality (e.g., Ackerman, 1980; Dworkin, 2000; Frankfurt, 1987; O'Neill, 2000; Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1992; Taylor, 1994; Young, 1990). Ronald Dworkin (2000) has put forth one recent and influential examination of the principle of equality and its place in a liberal democratic society. In his recent book, *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality*, he offers a comprehensive theory of justice centering on equality. For Dworkin, equality is and ought to be *the* fundamental value within liberal political theory. He acknowledges and grapples with the tension between liberty and equality as sovereign virtues, and he acknowledges that the two ideals work together; "they are mutually reflecting aspects of a single humanist ideal" (p. 134).

"Can it really be more important," he asks, "that the liberty of some people be protected, to improve the lives those people lead, than that other people, who are already worse off, have the various resources and other opportunities that *they* need to lead decent lives?" (p. 121). His major concern is that while equality may be a political ideal, it is not striven for in practice.

Consequently, Dworkin (2000) develops a conception of equality that he hopes can serve to justify government's redistribution of resources. He argues for the idea of "equality of resources," which emphasizes people's resources and opportunities, rather than equality of welfare, or persons' well-being throughout life. He defines equality of resources as a fair distribution of "whatever resources are owned privately by individuals" (p. 65). A person's resources would include wealth together with personal resources such as health, strength, and talent, and these together with "legal and other opportunities" (p. 286). I should note that it is not unproblematic for Dworkin to emphasize the importance of distributional equality. Iris Marion Young (1990), for one, criticizes theories that involve what she considers to be too heavy an emphasis on distributional justice. She prefers instead a relational conception of equality and justice. In her view, the liberal political emphasis on distribution of material possessions puts too much of an emphasis on *having* rather than *doing* and on the relations entailed therein.

According to Young, in order to have a just society, we ought to see justice as the elimination of institutional oppression and domination. In addition, the logic of distribution abstracts individuals from their social and institutional contexts. Relevant here from Young's critique is her emphasis on societal structures and on nondistributional issues such as decision making and division of labor. A focus on decision making leads to questions such as who has/had the power to decide on rules and procedures. In exploring the division of labor, we examine not only who has what job or position, but exactly what kinds of work those jobs entail. The issues that Young brings up are important to the discussion of educational opportunities.

Yet, Dworkin notes that his notion of equality of resources is fundamentally different from equality of opportunity. His major objection to theories of equality that focus on opportunity or capabilities, such as that of Amartya Sen (1992), is that they collapse into the notion of equality of welfare. Unlike equalizing opportunity, equalizing resources is an issue of distribution. While this is true, an issue of distribution may also be an issue of opportunity. For instance, if school A is well funded and can afford to pay a high price for curriculum materials, it is more difficult for school B, a poorly funded school, to buy those same materials. While such an example is indeed indicative of an inequality of resources, it is also indicative of an inequality of opportunity for students in school B. It seems that Dworkin's strict separation of equality of resources and equality of opportunity is misguided, or at least it fails to recognize how inextricably linked the two are. Equality of opportunity and equality of resources seem to be part and parcel of each other when analyzed in terms of education.

This is the basic thrust of Howe's (1997) *Understanding Equal Educational Opportunity: Social Justice, Democracy, and Schooling*, in which he examines three

different interpretations of the ideal of equality of educational opportunity: formalist, compensatory, and participatory. He does this in an attempt to advance a meaningful interpretation (participatory) built on defensible philosophical principles within the sea of misunderstanding surrounding this ideal.

Under the formalist interpretation, equal educational opportunity merely entails that there be no formal, or legal, barriers. As long as there is no physical barrier (like, for example, the separate but equal doctrine) stopping someone from the opportunity, then it may be considered an equal one. This conception is simplistic in that it ignores the relationship between students and the educational institution. Consider the monolingual Chinese-speaking students in the *Lau v. Nichols* (1974) case. Since they were allowed to attend school, formalists would argue that they had the same opportunity as other students to go to school and learn. Yet, with no bilingual education measures in place, that opportunity was an empty one because they could not understand the language of instruction and thus could not learn.

Under the compensatory interpretation, equal educational opportunity is fulfilled when students' disadvantages are remedied. The idea is that once individual student deficiencies are corrected, students can better adapt to the dominant system and achieve equal educational opportunity. The problem is that the compensatory interpretation advocates compensating students who, because they have not been a part of forming the educational system, are considered to be at a deficit. They thus have to sacrifice themselves by having to make unreasonable changes in order to fit in to the dominant structures, when it is those structures that ought to adapt to the needs of diverse students.

In response to the formalist and compensatory notions, which Howe sees as creating opportunities that are not "worth wanting," he fashions the participatory ideal (Howe, 1997, p. 3). The participatory ideal transcends both the formalist and the compensatory interpretations by focusing on the structural and institutional facets of education that cause oppression. In addition, it places inclusion and democratic deliberation at center stage and involves a renegotiation of the goals and procedures of education so that diverse perspectives can be included. This way, people who have been historically and are currently excluded from the educational conversation can have a voice and take part in the negotiation of educational opportunities that are actually worth having.

One compelling facet of Howe's work is that he examines various pressing educational problems through the lens of equality of educational opportunity. He uses his conception of equality of educational opportunity to stake out positions on hotly debated issues such as multicultural education, tracking, gender and schooling, vouchers, and testing.

Philosophers of education working in this egalitarian vein advance educational research on issues of inequality within education by attending not only to the theoretical analyses of the concepts of equality and justice but also to the issues of educational policy and practice that are intimately affected by these concepts (e.g., Gutmann, 1987; Moses, 2002; Reich, 2002). These exemplars show that philosophy provides a

unique perspective on issues of inequality in education that other disciplines do not.² This has to do with the tools, techniques, and analytical insights provided by those who are both disposed to and trained in philosophical inquiry. They provide examples of good, solid philosophical scholarship, but more important for my purposes here, they show that philosophical work can do more than merely contribute to theoretical conversation. Indeed, it can (and should) contribute philosophical perspectives on important normative questions of educational policy and practice, such as the problem of inequality within schools and colleges.

PHILOSOPHERS' CONTENTIONS

Philosophers of education are a diverse group, and there is much more disagreement about the place of philosophy within educational research than preceding sections of this chapter might suggest (e.g., Broudy et al., 1973; Burbules, 1990; Phillips, 1992; Soltis, 1981; Thomas, 1972). I will not undertake a thorough review of the contentions made by philosophers of education regarding the issues here.³ However, some mapping of the terrain and locating the place my position occupies within it will help better round out the chapter.

The two ways of doing philosophy described earlier—philosophy *in* educational research and philosophy *as* educational research—are artifacts of a deeper argument within philosophy of education. This argument centers on whether or not it is appropriate for philosophers to get involved in the messiness of contemporary educational issues.

Historically, philosophers of education have brought the analytical tools of the discipline of philosophy to bear on fundamental questions of education such as "What should education look like in a given society?" (Dewey, 1916; Gutmann, 1987; Peters, 1967; Plato, 1990; Reich, 2002). More recently, they have engaged in critical analyses of research methodology and empirical research (Garrison & Macmillan, 1994; House & Howe, 1999; Howe, 1997, in press; Phillips, 1987; Phillips & Burbules, 2000). They have also contributed to conceptualizing frameworks that may be used to ground and advance research, policy, and practice (Fletcher, 2000; Howe, 1997; Moses, 2002; Noddings, 1992; Reich, 2002). These philosophers are part of the legacy of Dewey, who brought to prominence the idea that educational practice needed to be based on solid philosophical footing. Although this seems like a reasonable enough claim to many, it was (and is) not without some controversy. As Burbules (2000a) sums up the matter, philosophy of education has a generally "contested status" (p. 3).

In the 1950s, philosophers of education debated whether or not normative claim about educational practice could rightly be derived from the general theories upon which philosophers love to expound (Broudy, 1981). Soon thereafter, during the arguably more socially conscious 1960s and 1970s, it became more accepted for philosophers of education to focus their scholarship on issues of schooling and its role in a changing society (Greene, 2000). In 1972, NSSE issued its third volum

with philosophy of education as a theme; it was titled *Philosophical Redirection of Educational Research*, and it actively linked philosophy with educational research (Thomas, 1972). The volume's central claim, as stated in the introduction, was that philosophers of education were now focused on "developing new models and paradigms to guide educational practice, including the important practice of educational research" (Dunkel, Gowin, & Thomas, 1972, p. 1). When philosophers of education engage in such work, the field has a closer relationship with the real world of schools and universities.

But philosophers of education involved in their main professional organization in the United States, the Philosophy of Education Society, have come under criticism from within their own ranks for neglecting important education policy issues surrounding school reform and other political trends (Tozer, 1991). From the point of view of such critics, philosophers of education should not only use philosophy *in* educational research, that is, clarify issues of educational importance as an intellectual endeavor; they should use philosophy *as* educational research, that is, apply their philosophical training and knowledge to questions of educational policy and practice so as to foster educational justice and progressive social change.

Some philosophers of education have gone further in this direction, believing that philosophy of education is *necessarily* based on examinations of educational policy and practice. Giarelli (1991), for one, argues that "philosophy is rooted in an analysis of educational practices" (p. 36). He further claims that philosophy does not just deliver a "grounding to education, but . . . educational practice . . . delivers to philosophy a point and a purpose for its existence and identity" (p. 36). With this set of claims, Giarelli makes the case for a conception of the interrelationships among the discipline of philosophy, philosophy of education, and educational practice, in which the paramount focus is on issues of practice. This, he maintains, is a "hopeful" position for philosophy of education (p. 37).

In a similar vein, Chris Higgins (2001) takes issue with the idea championed by Harvey Siegel (1981a, 1981b, 2001) that there should be no distinction between "pure" philosophy and philosophy of education (Higgins, 2001, p. 274). Higgins (2001) points out that many philosophers of education pursued the field of inquiry "precisely in the hope of doing something more 'real' philosophically than what passes for philosophy in most philosophy departments" (p. 274). His criticism of philosophy departments notwithstanding, Higgins makes a good point. A central aim and emphasis of scholarship for philosophers of *education* should be making a greater social contribution. Higgins's focus is teacher education, but his arguments may be broadened to include the philosophical movement within educational research advocating a focus on issues of social policy debates over social problems within education (see, e.g., Duarte, 1998; Fullinwider, 1991; Howe, 1997; Moses, 2002). I am not suggesting that there is no room for other kinds of philosophical scholarship under the rubric of philosophy of education. I am suggesting, however, that such work should not be seen as the heart of philosophical work in education.

The Problem of Relevance

Jonas Soltis (1981) distinguished between two senses of philosophy of education. One is a public sense, which has to do with *having* a philosophy of education, something important to many educational scholars and practitioners. This sense has led to studying philosophy of education through an "-isms" approach, or a philosophical positions approach, focusing on specific schools of thought within philosophy such as existentialism or progressivism (Broudy, 1981; Nelson, 1942, 1955). That approach has become less popular because it is perceived as being somewhat superficial and too rigidly compartmentalized.

The other sense Soltis discusses is a professional sense, in which trained philosophers of education use a technical philosophical perspective within discussions of issues of educational theory, policy, and practice. Soltis claims that in the latter half of the 20th century, the field of philosophy of education leaned more toward fostering the professional sense. He describes the philosopher of education as one who tries to "stimulate thought, elucidate meaning, provide critical appraisals, force careful judgment, and create conceptual frameworks for understanding the many philosophical dimensions of the complex business of education" (p. xi).

A decade after Soltis, Burbules (1990) pushed the discussion forward in terms of the so-called "dilemma of relevance" being faced by philosophers of education at the end of the 20th century (p. 187). He described an unfolding debate over the relevance of philosophy to education between two groups from within the ranks of philosophers of education. One group of scholars was more concerned with having philosophers of education engage in and produce sound work in the analytical philosophical tradition. Another group was more concerned with having them apply philosophy of education concepts and analytical techniques to educational issues and problems. This second group wanted to make sure that philosophy was relevant to educational research overall; indeed, some within this group argued that it was their responsibility to do so.

Burbules (1990) is among those who claim a middle ground for philosophy of education and maintain that there is room enough for diverse paths ranging from esoteric philosophical pursuits, critical analyses of empirical work, and examinations of traditional problems to philosophical analyses of contemporary educational issues. Burbules attempts to sidestep the horns of dilemma by claiming that "there isn't *any* one thing that all philosophers of education ought to do, except to be intellectually honest and as perceptive as possible" (p. 189).

Burbules is correct in that there is a place for many flavors of philosophy of education. But one may question whether philosophers of education can avoid the dilemma of relevance by merely being as honest and perceptive as possible. A given philosophical discussion may be perceptive, and even accessible, and yet, somehow, it may remain pedantic and of little use. Insofar as philosophy of education is stereotyped and dismissed as just so much scholasticism or polemic, the issue of relevance (to educational research) becomes important indeed.

While philosophical attention to more esoteric problems can be interesting and intellectually stimulating (and honest and perceptive), philosophy of education ought to give considerable attention to issues important to the field of education as a whole. A significant emphasis on this kind of work by philosophers of education will help to resolve—perhaps dissolve—the dilemma of relevance once and for all.

The Shifting Role of Philosophy of Education and Its Subject Matter

Philosophy of education serves to clarify the many, complex concepts put forth and positions taken by educational scholars, especially on controversial policy topics (Broudy, 1981). Indeed, as Francis Schrag (1994) points out, philosophers of education play an important role “in alerting educators to the hollowness and lack of substance found in some of the fads and movements that invade the educational stage” (p. 369). Examples of contemporary movements include cultural literacy/core knowledge, vouchers, and school report cards (see, e.g., Howe, 1997; Moses, 2000; Noddings, 1992; Raywid, 1987, 2002).

Philosophers of education may also alert educators to the value and righthandedness of some movements, and thus to the need for changes in policy and practice. Consider Reich’s (2002) work on liberalism and multiculturalism in education. He situates contemporary school reform movements within the deeper aims of education in a politically liberal society. His philosophical work helps show that multiculturalism should not be thought of as a fad invading the educational stage, but as a complex issue that needs to be taken seriously by educators interested in fostering democratic citizenship.

As early as 1981, Tom Green observed the growing connections among foundations of education in general, philosophy of education in particular, and education policy studies.⁴ As Green (1981) points out, philosophers are

disposed to feed on the problems of public policy. That is where the action is. Where once they aspired to speak to leadership on problems of teaching, they now seek to give direction by attending to politics and policy. (p. 84)

It is not, perhaps, such an either/or proposition; philosophers of education still comment on problems of teaching (e.g., Stengel, 2002; Zigler, 2002). Nevertheless, Green’s point that philosophers shifted their attention to matters of politics and policy is an important one.

Although Green (1981) highlights the relationship between philosophy of education and policy studies, he goes on to argue that philosophers may have little that will add to or enhance policy development and action. Instead, engaging in policy debates can greatly enhance philosophy.

Questions of educational policy do not come clearly labeled “philosophical.” They are not theoretical questions. Neither are they speculative. Nor is it at all clear that if policy makers—whoever they are—were philosophically more astute, they would therefore make better decisions. (Green, 1981, p. 84)

This is where Green’s view may be challenged. Policy questions incorporate theoretical commitments, even if only implicitly, and the best policymakers and policy decisions recognize this. Consider affirmative action policy, a controversial policy that often draws fire along the lines of political ideology (Edley, 1996; Moses, 2001). As I mentioned earlier, by providing nuanced and reasoned justifications for affirmative action policy, philosophical work may actually contribute to policy development and revision. While interests and political ideology are certainly at play within policy issues, they need not eclipse philosophical contributions to policy discussions (Moses & Gair, in press). The relationship between philosophy and education policy, then, is more reciprocal than Green (1981) allows.

It is not enough for philosophers of education to contribute to the abstract clarification of the complexities of the educational system. A deeper understanding of the world and of social structures such as the educational system really cannot ever be held separate from action. So, are philosophers of education obliged to go out and picket or stage sit-ins or takeovers of university administrations? Perhaps, when those actions are warranted and when the right philosopher of education is involved. But the point here is that scholarship by philosophers of education is most meaningful and yes, relevant, when it delves into the important issues of the day. This means that a philosophical examination of the value and drawbacks of charter schools, for instance (e.g., Knight Abowitz, 2001; Smith, 1999), better exemplifies what philosophers of education should be doing and should be known for doing than, say, an examination of why the use of the term *teaching* is or is not better than the term *instructing*.

Burbules (1990) provides another perspective on the shift in philosophy of education toward a greater emphasis on policy. He contends that it is not obligatory for the work of philosophers of education to be relevant to educational policy and practice; there may be good reasons for it to be relevant, but being relevant is not the duty of philosophers of education. He claims that when philosophers of education do make their work relevant, it tends to be out of self-interest rather than altruism or righteousness. Burbules is right that it is in the field’s best interest to be relevant to education practice. However, self-interest can also be (maybe even ought to be) nothing more than a by-product of doing work that is concerned with educational improvement and justice. At the heart of the philosophical enterprise is Socrates’s legacy that philosophers should join in contentious debates on the pressing social problems of the day.

A third perspective on the shift to an emphasis on policy is provided by D. C. Phillips. In his presidential address to the Philosophy of Education Society, Phillips (1992) examined whether “philosophizing should be related to social action” (p. 3) or limited to “an intellectual endeavor aimed at fostering deeper understanding” (p. 8). He maintained that, overall, philosophizing should best be aimed at fostering understanding and clarifying ideas. Its relation to social action may be real but should nonetheless be in the background, behind the analyses that philosophers are better at conducting. As such, Phillips claimed that “on the whole, when philosophers of

education become policy people, or dabble in empirical issues, on average they do a rather poor job because they do not have the training or the relevant background knowledge" (p. 7).

Therefore, philosophers should not be in the scholarly business of offering up solutions for social and educational problems, though philosophical work may be used to inspire the betterment of educational policy and practice. Phillips supports social action by philosophers of education as people, but not as philosophers and scholars. He writes that "as a concerned and educated person I do what I can to help combat" pressing social and educational problems, "but, as a philosopher, or as a philosopher of education, I don't have very much to say about them—the means of combating poverty is not a philosophical question" (p. 16).

Phillips's (1992) point of view is shared by others (Pratte, 1981; Siegel, 1981a; Siegel, 2001). Indeed, there is room within the field to pursue work in a more esoteric philosophical tradition, as mentioned earlier. However, to say that philosophers in general and philosophers of education in particular need not or should not engage in work that has direct application to educational policy and practice seems overly restrictive and unimaginative.

In direct response to one of Phillips's examples, the means of combating poverty can most definitely be a philosophical question. Consider Martha Nussbaum's (1999) excellent work in *Sex and Social Justice*. A philosopher of note, Nussbaum argues that there are universal obligations to protect human functioning; human beings *qua* human beings deserve certain things, foremost of which is the capability to perform and function in certain ways. She applies this argument to poor women in developing countries and maintains that women in any society have a variety of basic rights, including the right to develop their own capabilities, especially the capability to provide themselves with fundamental necessities such as food, nutrition, and literacy. In the course of her complex and multifaceted analysis, Nussbaum makes prescriptive policy recommendations that concern the *means* of combating persistent poverty.

One can find numerous examples of recommendations specifically regarding how to resolve various problems within education in the work of philosophers of education as well (e.g., Brighouse, 2000; Feinberg, 1998; Howe, 1997; Jessamin, 2002; Knight Abowitz, 2001; Moses, 2002; Noddings, 1992; Smith, 1999). Phillips and company might rejoice that these people are not *really* doing philosophy, or that they are, but they are also mixing in other intellectual pursuits with it. But these kinds of rejoinders just beg the question.

CONCLUSION

What tends to come to mind when "philosophy" is mentioned in the context of educational research? All too often nonphilosophers are confused, intimidated, or skeptical about philosophy of education. They are confused about what philosophy really is and how it can be rightfully included in research discussions—research that

is, after all, empirical, whereas philosophical inquiry generally is not. They wonder: Where are the data? What is the research design? They are intimidated by stereotypical philosophical analyses that are abstract, dense, and removed from the practical. This may be especially true for practitioner/researchers, who may feel that philosophical issues are too erudite or difficult and ultimately not worth understanding. They are skeptical about a type of inquiry that, although it may be interesting, does not seem to be an integral part of the business of educational research.

Theoretical discussions may be thought to have little bearing on education policy and practice. Yet, policy, methods, and practice in education presuppose philosophy and theory, though they often remain hidden (Gutmann, 1987). If only implicitly, a certain philosophical position underpins any education policy that may be advanced.

In this chapter, I have made the case that examination of education policy issues and debates is central to the field of philosophy of education. This, in turn, places philosophy of education scholarship at the heart of educational research. The various philosophical examinations of inequality in schools and universities highlight the importance of such work. In a time when schools and colleges of education are facing increased public criticism and questioning of the core endeavors of teacher education, it seems crucial to underscore the philosophical heart of an educational research establishment that is committed to educational improvement and social justice.

NOTES

¹ And at its 2000 annual meeting, the Philosophy of Education Society passed a motion to call on its members to "bring to the public serious philosophical consideration of standardized testing in the public schools" (Stengel, 2000, Section 8).

² Other disciplinary specialists have, of course, made major contributions to the study of inequality (e.g., Coleman, 1968); my point here is only that they are qualitatively different from philosophers' contributions.

³ For a thorough survey of the history of philosophy of education as a field of study, see Burbules (2000a).

⁴ Indeed, many academic programs in educational foundations are housed within the larger area of education policy studies. This makes good sense, particularly when we take into account the strong connection between the discipline of philosophy (especially social and political philosophy) and political science and political theory.

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